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Our three position papers were charged with considering “invention 
processes” in the rhetoric of science, technology, and medicine (RSTM) 
and with reflecting on how our subdiscipline can be “more inventive 
within academic and public contexts” (ARST, 2012). Invention processes 
can be considered in two ways under this charge: in relation to the 
discourses of STM itself, or in relation to the discourses we produce when 
we study it, though this distinction can collapse when their differences 
become our differences. In what follows, I want to cover three broad 
issues raised by these position papers, discussing problems and 
possibilities for our discipline under each heading:  (1) taxonomies of 
RSTM scholarship leading to questions about the nature of that 
scholarship and how it differs from what is produced in related 
disciplines; (2) difficulties and opportunities in addressing those in 
related fields or those who produce the discourse we study; and (3) areas 
for further work in RSTM.  
I. Taxonomies of RSTM Scholarship 
Professors Condit, Prelli, Depew, and Lyne offer us taxonomies of 
scholarship in the rhetoric of science, technology, and medicine, carving 
the beast at different joints. Focusing on invention strategies in the 
discourses studied (in the first of three parts of his paper), Prelli identifies 
two categories depending on whether the analyst attends to language and 
figurative invention or to the invention of arguments (stases, topoi, etc.).1 
                                                        
1 A word of clarification is in order on the term “figures of thought,” 
mentioned by both Prelli and Depew/Lyne in this issue. A bit of 
background: An early and highly influential taxonomy of figures of speech 
is found in Book IV of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, where there is a 
division of devices into figurae verborum and figurae sententiarum. Harry 
Caplan (1954) translates these phrases into figures of words and figures of 
thought. Figures of words includes all those devices that can be described 
in terms of syntax or word choice, or both. Later, these devices were 
called tropes and schemes. My work has focused on the schemes and on 
some devices of word choice like polyptoton and ploche, not on figures of 
thought. The sententiarum in figurae sententiarum is the genitive plural 
of sententia, a very difficult word to translate. It can mean thought, 
purpose, meaning or sentence, or something closer to a maxim or the 
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Condit categorizes according to the purpose of the scholarly essay: theory 
building and improving science communication on the one hand, or 
indicting science as oppressive and too powerful on the other. Depew and 
Lyne provide a taxonomy of published scholarship according to subject 
matter or approach (major scientists, genres, fields, controversies, 
rhetorical invention, episodes, public use of scientific terms, language and 
figures, incommensurability, rhetoric and philosophy, rhetorical uses of 
expertise, medicine, materiality, risk, visual rhetoric, science and 
religion). Imagining these taxonomies as transparent overlays on an 
aerial photo of the terrain, each brings different aspects of the scholarship 
into prominence.  But any one point could be located through all three 
layers. A graduate student in the field could, for example, place a project 
in all three taxonomies simultaneously: “Well, I am interested in studying 
methods of argumentation (Prelli) in the scientific controversy about the 
Flores Hobbit (Depew and Lyne) in order to contribute to rhetorical 
theory on studying controversies (Condit). Scholars need all three: a 
method, a subject matter, and an exigence defining their contribution. 
These useful taxonomies do, however, conflate a potential distinction: 
that between studies of STM texts addressed within disciplines and those 
addressed to various publics. Condit (this issue) focuses on “academic 
essays addressing the public rhetorics of science and technology” but 
takes her concerns as applying generally to disciplinary discourse. Prelli 
and Depew and Lyne focus more on academic studies but also do not limit 
their taxonomies. Should there be a robust distinction here or not? Do we, 
for example, use or need different methods to study arguments made in 
the back pages of Science or Nature from those made in the front in the 
editorials, perspective pieces, review articles and news items? This 
potential difference will resurface in the following discussion. Among 
arguments for eliding differences is, first, the fact that earlier texts, while 
not uniformly accessible, nevertheless did not have professionally-niched 
audiences in mind (e.g., Lyell’s Principles of Geology); second, some 
                                                                                                                                         
point of a phrase; simply defining it as distinct from verborum, it names 
devices which cannot be pinned down linguistically. I have favored 
grouping these figures of thought as devices that perform certain high 
profile speech acts; there are other ways to categorize them. Furthermore, 
the schemes (antithesis, antimetabole, incrementum, etc.) are primarily 
of interest because they epitomize certain lines of argument. Hence this 
work also fits Prelli’s second category concerned with analyzing 
argumentation with rhetorical theory. My contention is that some 
syntactic and lexical choices function as epitomes of certain lines of 
argument (as the most succinct/complete expression available). Because 
early modern scientists were thoroughly trained in the argument/figure 
connection, they readily brought certain “figures of argument” into their 
texts. For those who know the figures as thoroughly as they did, verbal 
expression can have heuristic power in directing the invention of 
applicable lines of argument and hence can affect physical/experimental 
practices. I certainly agree with Prelli then on the generative power of 
available forms. But, of course, nature need not cooperate. 
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contemporary scientists continue to make their arguments to wider 
publics, sometimes to gain ground in a controversy (e.g., Adovasio and 
Page’s The First Americans); and, third, controversies in Goodnight’s 
“technical sphere” are often generated from or play out in the “public 
sphere” (e.g., laetrile as a cancer therapy) and, fourth, the preferred 
model for science/public interaction is collaboration minimizing 
differences, not one-way communication from the expert to the ignorant 
(e.g., Gross’s 1994 article favoring a contextual over a deficit model of 
science communication). On the other hand, one reason for maintaining 
the difference comes from the easily conducted pedagogical experiment of 
having students with some rhetorical training work on an editorial on a 
science policy issue and then on an article from, say, Hippocampus or The 
Journal of Nonlinear Optical Physics and Materials.  Of course, with or 
without a sharp separation between expert and non-expert discourse, 
attention to how differently sourced texts address differently informed 
audiences with different stakes in the material is surely one of the 
distinctions of a study labeled rhetorical. And that brings us to the next 
critical issue. 
What Makes STM Scholarship Rhetorical and Why Do It? 
Condit notes “a lack of sufficient collective-reflectiveness” (this issue) and 
issues a challenge for debate about the purposes of RSTM scholarship. 
But before we can debate the purpose of our enterprise perhaps we need 
to clarify its nature. There is good reason for asking this identity question 
yet again because, as noted in our position papers, many diverse academic 
fields attend to STM practices and discourse: not only the obvious big 
three —history, sociology, and philosophy—but also linguistics, literary 
studies, visual studies and art history, journalism, public relations, as well 
as applied fields like Public Health or Environmental Studies. What are 
our relations to these other subfields? How are we different? Alike? Prelli 
asks this question in the third part of his paper, especially in relation to 
“cross-disciplinary work with colleagues in other fields of STM studies.” 
Imagine academics putting together an interdisciplinary team, some 
version of the “sustainability” group Prelli mentions. What would 
rhetoricians bring to the table? We think we know, but would scholars in 
other STM disciplines? As cases warrant, we study contexts like 
historians, audiences like sociologists, metaphor like literary scholars, 
language data like linguists, and argumentation practices like informal 
logicians or philosophers. We could simply add ourselves to a generalized 
science studies “metadiscipline” that deploys methods established in 
these fields depending on the project. But that would sacrifice our 
theoretical and historical grounding in a distinct discipline and falsify the 
history of these other disciplines in relation to rhetoric. 
The “identity” question appeared in all three papers. Their common 
thread? RSTM is (1) distinctive for its attention to the choices that rhetors 
make against a background of possibilities, both in malleably defined 
contexts as well as at every possible level of formal analysis; and (2) 
different in pursuing the “why behind” and “what follows from” these 
choices. The choices (in modalities not limited to the verbal) constitute 
the “argument,” the direct and indirect bids for intersubjective 
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agreement. It is the background of possibilities for the choices, especially 
the formal possibilities, that is often invisible to non-rhetoricians. 
Scientists and science writers are often aware of their options as they 
produce texts and visuals, but they lack rhetorical theory’s analytical 
vocabulary for defining the possibilities at interconnected levels, 
including lines of argument, arrangement tactics, methods for 
characterizing the rhetorical situation and its players, and the deeper 
epistemically-orienting choices that come from larger patterns of 
selection and omission. Rhetorical theory is so overwhelmingly rich in 
options for analysis, and the actual material we can pay attention to is so 
limited by the space available in a typical scholarly study, that we always 
face our own radical selection dilemma.  
The issue of what should/ should not count as rhetorical scholarship 
of scientific discourse has of course been visited before. Randy Harris 
discussed this boundary problem ably and thoroughly in 1997 and 
convincingly defined “rhetoric of science” as the “analysis of scientific 
discourse by scholars whose primary allegiances are to the guiding 
notions of rhetorical theory” (p. xxviii). Building on Harris, I (2007) 
acknowledged the same identity issue in a review essay written ten years 
later, but I included many cognate studies for the sake of coverage, taking 
a “metadisciplinary” approach. While convenient, such a broad view does 
not contribute to clarifying what a rhetorically informed study achieves. 
Depew and Lyne wonder, in effect, if rhetoric’s contribution, our “primary 
allegiance,” is clear to other scholars and “whether we rhetoricians of 
science have taken full advantage of the opening created by the broader 
discursive-social turn to articulate, deploy, and advertise our distinctive 
yet varied approach” (this issue). I think the simple answer is we have not. 
Yet how we define the nature and contribution of RSTM determines how 
we present ourselves to other disciplines in the academy, to the scientific 
community, and to the public. Surely ARST has a role in that 
presentation. 
The relation of RSTM to other science studies disciplines has practical 
consequences for, among other reasons, the visibility of its scholarship, 
especially through literature-searching options. While books on science 
subjects with a rhetorical orientation make it through to the online 
database in the History of Science, Technology and Medicine, that 
resource does not cover work appearing in Rhetoric Society Quarterly or 
Rhetoric Review. The Communication & Mass Media Complete database 
does cover these but not, it seems, Written Communication, and while the 
MLA Bibliography does cover the main rhetoric journals, it does not 
reference communication journals.  
How aware are other academics of rhetorical approaches? Among 
practitioners in related disciplines, sociologists are certainly aware of 
rhetorical approaches; they may even subsume RSTM, considering 
rhetoric as the techne of constructionism. (Depew/Lyne (this issue) cite 
Latour’s notice (albeit of a “despised” discipline.) The other two major 
disciplines studying science, history and philosophy, seem less likely to 
identify a distinct rhetorical approach or subdiscipline, though both also 
study scientific movements and discourse and even scientific 
argumentation, and the overlaps are considerable. 
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Historians of science are certainly allied practitioners, yet they are 
often apparently unaware of rhetorical schlarship.2 They also routinely 
study the culture/science nexus and interpret discourse (as well as 
material artifacts and spaces), and they could use many of the categories 
in Depew and Lyne’s taxonomy for their own work. Furthermore, if we 
define a rhetorical approach as involving an awareness of choices among 
possibilities, the historians of science have their apparently “rhetorical 
moments” as illustrated in the following passage from an article in Isis, 
the premier journal in the history of science. I use this very slight example 
to highlight the superficial similarities but perhaps deeper differences 
between a historical approach with “rhetorical instincts” and a rhetorical 
approach. The author, Alisha Rankin, had worked with an archive of 
sixteen thousand letters by and to Anna of Saxony, wife of the Elector, 
who was an effective medical practitioner and producer of distilled 
medicines and herbal remedies in sixteenth-century Germany. Rankin 
uses passages from the letters to argue for the existence of a network of 
noblewomen organized like artisans practicing a trade. To that end, she 
singles out the significance of Anna referring to Dorothea of Mansfeld in 
one of her letters as her lehrmeister, “a choice” that Rankin considers 
“striking in this setting” because it is an “ambiguous term that could 
mean ‘teacher'’but also invoked a master-apprentice relationship” and 
therefore “implied a hierarchy of knowledge” (Rankin, 2007, p. 37). In the 
article overall, this datum supports the case for artisan practices and 
therefore for “experimentalism” among this group of women and 
generally at this time in German courts. This attention to a particular 
word choice out of other possibilities (not mentioned) is fairly typical of 
the textual analysis in historical scholarship where language choices 
function as sign arguments for attitudes and themes. In other words, this 
piece of evidence is taken as a representation, not as a communication, 
though the details indicate that the letter accompanied samples of a 
distilled aqua vitae sent from Anna to Dorothea urging her to test the 
results and perhaps disclose more of her art. In short, rhetoricians would 
also note the more immediate context of one person communicating with 
another for a particular purpose. But I do not want to over-claim here. 
Representation and communication are two sides of the same interpretive 
coin, and it is easy to blend them by saying that what is represented is 
what is communicated. But decoding representations is the typical end 
point in historical and literary studies of science where texts are prized 
                                                        
2 In a set of articles in Isis five years ago on the connections between 
the History and Philosophy of Science, Peter Galison (2008) listed ten 
problems that need addressing. Among these was Problem #3, 
“Technologies of Argumentation.” Galison called especially for more work 
in earlier periods, but suggested asking, “What are the tools, and 
procedures needed at a given time to construct an acceptable scientific 
argument?” Citing also the lack of an analytic scheme for understanding 
how visualization practices work, he wondered, “what is the toolkit of 
argumentation and demonstration—and what is its historical trajectory? 
(2008, p. 116). Galison seemed unaware of scholarship on the 
rhetorical/dialectical toolkit and its history. 
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more for their signifying power—reading back to the culture that 
produced them—than for their communicative agency creating that 
culture. 
Back to Condit’s challenge. With RSTM as defined in our position 
papers, what is its purpose? Here the potential division into two streams 
surfaces again. If there is a difference in rhetorical studies of disciplinary 
STM discourse and rhetorical studies of STM discourse in public venues, 
then do we have different purposes and justifications? Focusing on 
science discourse in public venues to begin with, we could argue that 
these studies differ only in subject matter from rhetorical studies of 
political, religious, economic or any other public discourse. We use the 
same tools as rhetoricians in any other subdiscipline and just turn them 
on a different body of material. If the studies of those discourses are 
justified, then so are ours. So far as epistemic rather than public 
discourses of science are concerned, rhetorical studies of this material 
would be no different from studies of other knowledge-forming texts, 
though there are few such studies of the rhetoric of other disciplines. 
These “rhetoric as epistemic” studies examine the formation of bodies of 
knowledge in terms of a field’s standards of argumentation, certainly a 
justification for the enterprise. My own view is that there is a historical 
reason for studying science rhetorically that stems from the origins of 
modern science in the sixteenth-century reform of the discourse arts, 
foregrounding rhetoric, and in the establishment of the conventions of 
scientific argument over the centuries by practitioners thoroughly trained 
in the art. But even without that rationale, scientists themselves would 
agree that their goal is to convince their peers, institutions, and the public 
about the validity and value of what they do, so studying scientific 
discourse as persuasion can be justified as the approach that most closely 
matches its nature. 
Condit points out that some RSTM scholarship is critical if not out-
right antagonistic to the scientific enterprise and its institutions. Because 
of rhetoric’s emphasis on argument and communication, and therefore on 
results, effects, consequences, and downstream repercussions, it is not 
surprising that scholarship on RSTM practices in public venues can turn 
critical and point out where choices have had or can have problematic 
effects. Scientists are also not above criticism, any more than any other 
elite, when they use their cultural authority to promote agendas outside 
their area of expertise and even outside what is warranted by what they 
know and the certainty with which they know it in their own fields. So 
criticism is certainly not off the table. I do, however, agree with Condit 
that a prima facie antagonism to science, technology, and medicine on 
the part of rhetorical scholars is inappropriate and unwarranted. 
Unfortunately, an impression that RSTM is exclusively deconstructive 
and antagonistic to science certainly exists. (More on this problem 
below.) Again, it is surely ARST’s role to correct such misunderstandings. 
II. Addressing the Subject 
Some work in RSTM has found an audience among scientists, especially 
among those seeking help in communicating with the public or 
addressing granting agencies. Those who work in the rhetoric of 
 Jeanne Fahnestock  Poroi 9,1 (April 2013) 7 
medicine/health communication have a receptive audience among 
practitioners. Condit’s advice to the genetics community, published in 
their journals, is a model here (e.g., 2001, 2007), and the expanding 
enterprise of teaching science and technical writing to undergraduate and 
graduate students has resulted in textbooks, courses and whole programs 
teaching the genres of science writing (e.g., Harmon & Gross, 2010; 
Penrose & Katz, 2009). Furthermore, there have been successful 
collaborative studies between rhetoricians and scientists, especially of the 
type where scientists allow access to their drafts and procedures or 
answer directed questions (e.g., Blakeslee, 2000; Charney, 1993). These 
studies tend, however, to be addressed to other RSTM scholars. Beyond 
that audience, there are impediments that make it difficult for rhetorical 
studies to get a hearing from those whose discourse we study. 
Using the “R” Word 
Anyone wanting to engage scientists under the banner “Rhetoric” has to 
be aware that in Science and Nature, publications widely read by 
scientists and allied professionals, the term is overwhelmingly used in 
negative contexts. Indeed a search of the term rhetoric in the online 
Science archive yields 1158 uses, and a sampling of the quotations 
provided suggests that the overwhelming majority are pejorative, from an 
1883 lament that competitive examinations for professorships  “too often 
give the showy qualities of rhetoric and smartness the preference over 
solid merit as proved by original research” (“Present State,” 1883), to the 
most recent in a September 2012 complaint about  “the torrent of 
campaign rhetoric” that obscures the science policies of the candidates 
(Malakoff, 2012, p. 337; the very earliest uses in 1881 refer to chairs of 
rhetoric in neutral ways). In a similar search of Nature, a sampling of the 
resulting 610 instances (1205 including its other holdings) yields the same 
profile of negative usage. The typical immediate context for these 
appearances of rhetoric is an article reporting on news of interest to 
scientists. Overall, the use of the word rhetoric in Science and Nature 
trends with its use at large as a term with negative associations, as 
evidenced by a search in the Corpus of Contemporary American English 
(COCA) where rhetoric collocates with political, despite, reality, harsh, 
fiery and mere (COCA). None of these details will surprise this audience, 
but they are worth remembering. The response, however, should not be to 
drop the “R” word from our scholarship and advocacy. 
Rare bright spots have occurred with the reviews of work by Gross and 
Harmon in Nature (Shapin, 2007) and by Leah Ceccarelli in Science 
(Rorty, 2001; and I may be focusing too narrowly on these two 
international weeklies.) Still, consider that Stephen Shapin’s review of 
Gross and Harmon’s 2007 anthology The Scientific Literature: A Guided 
Tour, titled “The Art of Persuasion,” is followed by the subtitle, 
“Surprisingly, the rhetoric of the literary artist still has a place in 
persuasive scientific texts” (2007, p. 751). Shapin also observes that 
“There are now many historical and sociological studies of scientific 
communication” (p. 751), but evidently in his view no rhetorical ones. In 
Richard Rorty’s (2001) review of Ceccarelli’s Shaping Science with 
Rhetoric, there is actually an endorsement of the fledging field of the 
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“rhetoric of science,” but as far as Science readers would know since then, 
the fledgling apparently died in the nest.33 
Parallel Discourses: A Digression 
To add to the impediments of talking about rhetoric to professional 
communities who, in our terms, produce it, is the fact that there is now a 
parallel discourse under construction in evolutionary psychology/biology 
and in the neurosciences covering concepts long identified in rhetorical 
theory.  Consider, for example, recent changes in the discourse of 
evolutionary biology, Depew and Lyne’s territory (e.g., Depew, 2010; Lyne 
& Howe, 1990). For decades it has been a goal in evolutionary 
biology/psychology (once called sociobiology) to account for how 
evolution by natural selection could favor cooperation or altruism in any 
species, including humans, since any organism not acting in its own best 
interests seems liable to be selected out of existence. The standard 
answer, popularized by Richard Dawkins, has been kin selection 
formalized in Hamilton’s law. Cooperative or altruistic actions are only 
favored to the degree they are exercised toward offspring or siblings in 
ways mathematically proportional to the degree of gene sharing. (Here is 
where those canonical examples that Depew and Lyne talk about came in 
handy.) But in the past few years, kin selection or “inclusive fitness” has 
been demoted in favor of a more complex view of the selective pressures 
favoring cooperative behavior and, in the case of humans, attention has 
shifted to gene-culture co-evolution. Even E.O. Wilson (2012) now 
recants his former faith in kin selection and declares his conversion in his 
most recent work, The Social Conquest of Earth. The current lead 
spokesperson for this new view is Martin Nowak (2012). In a campaign 
conducted in disciplinary journals, in Science, in Scientific American and 
a quasi-popular book (short title Super Cooperators), Nowak promotes a 
view of five selective pressures favoring cooperation: spatial selection, kin 
selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and group selection 
(2006; he can also be credited with coining an outrageous agnominatio 
which nevertheless perfectly epitomizes his case for an alternate view fit 
to displace a familiar one: “Life therefore is not just a struggle for 
survival—it is also, one might say, a snuggle for survival” [2012, p. 36]). 
Direct reciprocity is the “tit for tat” that one often sees in game theoretical 
modeling of selection strategies: individuals exchange favors one on one. 
But, as Nowak explains, in “indirect reciprocity, one individual decides to 
aid another based not on reciprocal benefit but on the needy individual’s 
reputation. Those who have a reputation for assisting others who fall on 
hard times might even find themselves on the receiving end of good will 
from strangers” (2012, p. 38; see also Wilson, 2012, 249). It seems then 
                                                        
3 There have been other “sightings” in Science of the term “rhetoric of 
science” since then referencing a discipline, including from science writer 
Steve Olsen, reviewing books on the Intelligent Design debate (Olsen, 
2004), and from Miriam Solomon (2008) reviewing Susan Haack’s 
(2003) Defending Science. These are single mentions in the context of 
criticism. 
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that individuals can accrue benefits on the basis of what other people 
think about them. Sound familiar? 
Again, in “Adapted to Culture,” the British evolutionary biologist 
Mark Pagel (2012) takes an essentially rhetorically-friendly view of 
language as a “social technology” that evolved because it was needed. He 
also lists humans’ ability to discern the thoughts and intentions of others 
(theory of mind) as kick-starting the evolution of cooperation in human 
cultures, along with language, but he does not really put these two factors 
together. Yet, the notion of using language to secure cooperation by 
taking the listener’s views into account (aka rhetoric) seems just a step 
away. A similar rhetoric-compatible understanding of language is on 
display in a recent study of a tribe of “hunter gatherers” who presumably 
provide access to earlier patterns of human social organization. Here the 
authors note that the cooperation they observed had perhaps two 
explanations: one, that cooperators who form ties to one another leave 
defectors out in the cold; “Another is that people may influence the 
cooperative behaviour of their networks” (Apicella, Marlowe, and Fowler, 
et al., 2012).  Of course, by “influence,” evolutionary biologists mean 
something less than “full court” persuasion to belief or action, and they 
are usually only concerned with modeling influence in networks (i.e. 
pairwise relations more easily mapped mathematically), though 
“influence” can include person-to-person advocacy in a political campaign  
(Nickerson, 2008). Nevertheless, the rediscovery of persuasion in studies 
of “hunter-gatherers” is obvious. As these examples from the discourse of 
evolutionary biology show, terms like reputation and influence have 
cognate meanings to concepts rhetoricians are familiar with, creating 
potential interference with rhetorically-grounded approaches.  
On the positive side of crossover, rhetoricians owe a debt of gratitude 
to the neurosciences and their able researchers/ rhetorical 
accommodators, the most well known being Antonio Damasio (1994) and 
Joseph LeDoux (2002), who have justified the place of emotion/pathos in 
human reasoning and “decision making,” where it has always been in 
rhetorical theory (see Condit, 2011). But at the same time one comes 
across an article in Nature concluding that “People’s grasp of scientific 
debates can improve if communicators build on the fact that cultural 
values influence what and whom we believe,” an insight that apparently 
escaped “prevailing theories of science communication” (Kahan, 2010). I 
confess to a kind of amazement when I encounter evidence of these 
reconstructions of the starting points of rhetorical theory. This parallel 
discourse is the context, and a potential impediment, to introducing a 
rhetorical vocabulary for similar ideas. But perhaps it should be seen 
instead as an opportunity for the “transilient perspective” (Condit & 
Railsback, 2005) that Condit calls for, tracing the “continuities and 
discontinuities among the humanities, natural sciences, and social 
sciences” (this issue).   
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Gratitude Unlikely 
In their discussion of “Rhetoric as Process,” Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca point out the inevitable devaluing effect of identifying the 
techniques of persuasion: “the mere presence of schemes of argument and 
techniques of persuasion that are theoretically transferable to other 
discourses may be enough to suggest the charge of device” (1969, p. 452). 
There is, in other words, an innate criticism in the descriptive rhetorical 
analysis of any text, especially texts in the sciences, which are supposedly 
dictated by the authors’ findings (even though all acknowledge that their 
content has been molded into the form demanded by the genre of the 
science article). An apparently critical stance to the object of analysis 
therefore seems an inevitable consequence of the simple act of identifying 
techne, and the subject of such an analysis is not likely to be grateful. The 
identification of device in rhetorical terms can even provoke the defensive 
response that the analyst is just re-labeling the obvious, something not 
unlike my reaction to the parallel discourse noted above. 
The circumstances complicating how rhetorical scholars address the 
larger scientific community come then, in part, from the negative 
associations lingering in popular usage of the term rhetoric, from the 
presence in scientific publications of a parallel discourse that discusses 
issues long familiar in rhetorical theory, and from the inevitably critical 
impression that can accompany any identification of methods typically 
invisible to their user. There are perhaps strategies for overcoming these 
impediments, and ARST should have a role in finding them. 
III. Future Work 
Despite the “Rodney Dangerfield” overtones of the previous section, like 
any subdiscipline, RSTM has an audience, and the most important one, 
the one that sets the standards: its own practitioners. The purpose, or 
exigence, of any particular study has to be argued into place by its authors 
in the opening of that study, and previous work often provides exigence 
for further work. Judging by publications and programs, the field is 
expanding and will expand in the future. Our three position papers all 
address the important issue of “inventing” the future for the RSTM, and 
Depew and Lyne remind us that the potential subject matter is vast. What 
are recommended directions? Where are changes in what we study taking 
us? The following brief list suggests some possibilities. 
 
1. Condit points out the English language and Euro-American bias in 
RSTM scholarship and encourages a more global/ international 
perspective.  
No one is likely to disagree with that call; this organization took the term 
“American” out of its title in 2006.  But I would like to offer some 
reservations. Contemporary science is largely—not exclusively, but 
largely—a European enterprise in its origins, and currently English is the 
lingua franca of scientific communication around the world. Science has 
an international workforce, and a lab in Finland may have an Argentinian 
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director, a Taiwanese researcher, and a German postdoc who all 
communicate with each another in English. And though there is no 
reason to suppose this dominance will continue, currently approximately 
90% of scientific periodicals are published in English (Hamel, 2008). 
Depending on how Whorfian one’s assumptions are, this English bias 
does or does not make a difference in the resulting knowledge argued into 
place (see Swales, 1997), but it does not seem likely that Euler’s constant e 
changes its value on different continents or that the role of the pancreas 
in diabetes is different in Pakistan and the US. 
However, communicating STM issues and policies to larger publics is 
something else, and the cultural and linguistic differences can be 
enormous. HIV-prevention campaigns across the globe, for example, have 
to be tailored to cultural norms. For this kind of international work, there 
has to be collaboration with people in other countries with the necessary 
linguistic and social expertise. Knowing another language is not enough. 
The prospects for international collaborative work are becoming more 
likely with the creation of the Rhetoric Society of Europe and the opening 
of the first Department of Rhetoric and Communication in China at 
Beihang University in 2011. Of course there is also the problem of 
whether the rhetorical theory we practice, albeit in international contexts, 
is itself Euro-American and if it is not, need not or should not be, we are 
back with the “nature of” question. 
 
2. I would strongly underscore Prelli’s point, one I have also made 
elsewhere, that more work needs to be done on the Visual 
Rhetoric of Science.  
Here Alan Gross has once again pointed the way in articles and in his 
forthcoming book with Joseph Harmon, What One Picture is Worth. This 
need is driven by the fact that, as Gross has amply pointed out, scientific 
discourse (and also that in technology and medicine) is and has been 
historically characterized by its use of visuals. All the disciplines studying 
STM discourse are aware of this need. Among historians, for example, M. 
Norton Wise (2006) introduced a “Focus” section in Isis on “Science and 
Visual Culture,” complaining that historians had paid little attention to 
images and their epistemological significance and calling for a basic 
survey of image-making modes and a “need to understand images as 
arguments” (p. 75). A model for explaining how visuals work as 
arguments can be found in Prelli’s (2006) analysis of the U.S. and 
Canadian maps and graphics used in a legal dispute over fishing banks in 
the Atlantic. 
There has already been significant work on visuals used in science 
from every possible disciplinary angle, and of course Visual Rhetoric is a 
major field in Communication Studies (a point not noted in Wise’s 2006 
Focus articles on “Science and Visual Culture”). There is a growing body 
of rhetorical theorizing on and empirical studies of how images persuade, 
what kinds of arguments they embody or assist, and how they reinforce or 
are reinforced by verbal arguments. Nor are rhetoricians the only ones on 
this quest; informal logicians have been debating how pictures argue in 
their very tight sense of the word argue for almost twenty years (see 
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Aspeitia, 2012). But overall visual rhetoric (or variously visual 
communication or visual studies) lacks an overarching theory uniting the 
work of semioticians, of art and graphics historians, of practitioners like 
Tufte and Frankel, and of argumentation theorists or rhetoricians with 
their focus on persuasion. There has yet to be a single treatise with the 
explanatory power for visual rhetoric comparable to that of Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric. Furthermore, general theories of visual 
persuasion will have to be adapted to visualization in the sciences where 
there are unique problems posed by instrument-mediated visualization 
and the evolution of practices like “visual abstracts.”  
 
3. Certainly other topics could be added to a wish list of areas for 
future work. All of Depew and Lyne’s categories are underserved. I 
would also suggest the following: 
a.  There should be more studies of the rhetoric of 
technology, the applied science that drives the 
economy. 
Bazerman’s (2002) The Languages of Edison’s Light is exemplary but 
isolated. A seminal work in technology studies like David Nye’s (1999) 
American Technological Sublime suggests how many potential subjects 
await rhetorical treatment.  
b. Scholars in digital studies have noted the seismic shift 
to the Internet as a medium for scientific collaboration 
and communication.  
More than just new accessibility (e.g., PubMed with its special filters and 
translators accessing MEDLINE and other databases), the web has 
prompted new solely online publications like PLOS ONE (formerly PLoS 
ONE) and the Frontiers journals, starting with Frontiers in Neuroscience. 
Even print journals are changing their content, and the nature of their 
arguments, with the new affordance of links to supporting material on 
line. Whenever the medium changes, the rhetorical affordances change, 
and these online journals with their faster rates of reviewing and 
publishing and their bibliometric protocols are altering the interactivity of 
research fields and the nature of the impact factor from citation to 
viewing/downloading. However, this new medium has yet to change the 
need for “journal” publication as an authorizing warrant for the credibility 
of a scientific research report, though it is now dead easy to create ersatz 
journals, plausible Internet portals that are money-making schemes to 
collect fees for publication. Jeffrey Beall (2012), a librarian at the 
University of Colorado Denver, reports on his blog “Scholarly Open 
Access” of the instant creation of the online International Journal of 
Engineering Sciences and Research Technology with seven bogus 
previous issues, possibly generated, Beall speculates, by using SCIgen, an 
automatic Computer Science paper generator (October 18, 2012). Given 
the ease of fabrication on the Internet, and the current explosion of 
retractions based on fraud and plagiarism facilitated by the Internet, it is 
clear that this medium is affecting scientific communication in ways that 
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have yet to play out. RSTM should be active in examining and assessing 
the shift to an Internet-enabled knowledge economy. 
Conclusion 
There will and should occur, as in any active field, new perspectives and 
combinations of methods and subject matter. Ideally, there should be 
more specifically rhetorical histories of scientific discourse. By “rhetorical 
histories,” I mean tracings of the rise, change, and occasional fall of 
argmentative practices, devices, methods, techniques, or of the 
commonplaces of STM that Prelli mentions. Within fields, these can be 
histories of certain special topoi, though rhetorical theory also looks at 
devices that cross content areas. This last category strikes me as especially 
important to the visibility of RSTM as a unique discipline, and there 
should be creative combinations here that have never appeared before. 
Such scholarship of the future is likely to come from a new generation 
who have credentialed training in both rhetoric and in a scientific 
specialty. Again, ARST should have a hand in promoting this invention, as 
it has in eliciting the three position papers that set an agenda for 
constructive debate. 
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